On 19 August 2026, the campaigns for 2027 presidential and National Assembly elections started and here was my initial take on the race for presidency, posted on my WhatsApp status: The 1st best time to defeat Tinubu was when he needed to get APC presidential ticket, the 2nd was immediately after he won in 2023, the 3rd best time was when ADC was formed and had Obi and Kwankwaso in it. The 4th time to defeat Tinubu is when Atiku leaves the scene (which is not happening), and it's an Asiwaju-Obi race—backed by Atiku and other former men of power. The 5th best time is when Obi quits (which is also not happening). The 6th and last best time is when Tinubu, by disinterest or death, does not appear on the ballot (which is also 99.9% not happening).
I went further, disclaiming the sixth case as the last: Oh, sorry, here is the last—and 7th-time: when Nigerians are angry at the argument that Tinubu cannot be defeated by current alternatives, at such intensity as seen in #EndSARS, at such depth as seen in the 2015 presidential election, and as fearlessly as the pushback against 2012 fuel subsidy removal.
For someone who had criticized the administration of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, it was an uncomfortable thing to say that the 2027 presidential race was already decided. To speak from a place of emotion would mean not saying the quoted status. The key point I had hoped to make was that the opposition had wasted the best chances they had to ensure Tinubu's defeat in 2027, the last one being the exit of Peter Obi from the African Democratic Congress (ADC). As I identified in my WhatsApp post, the first time to defeat Tinubu was in the race to get the presidential ticket of the APC.
Defeating Tinubu, a president that had yet to rule, prior to the APC primaries for the 2023 presidential election was best for two reasons. First, APC was the ruling and the strongest party in Nigeria, having Tinubu as its flagbearer only strengthened them. PDP needed Tinubu not to run if it would stand any chance of winning. But it did not. The party had lost its capacity to challenge APC long before the race even began. It started with shedding some of its prominent members to APC, then by having no buffer against opposition attacks on President Goodluck Jonathan, and, lastly, its refusal to follow the unwritten rule of power rotation within the Nigerian ruling class.
The second reason was the nature of the man himself. Bola Ahmed Tinubu, the man whose academic history still remains mysterious, had a record of never losing an election. To his admirers, he is a master strategist who knows when to contest, and when not to contest, who knows what to do, and when to do it; who knows capable hands, and where to fit them in. These are questionable, and indeed, seriously debated attributes, but the core idea here is this: whether anyone was—and is—convinced or not, the image of Bola Tinubu as a political institution on his own, hard to defeat by anyone, circulated by his devout followers, gave (and still gives) him an unfair advantage where any opposition to his ambition becomes a reactionary attempt to stop something that had the assuredness of predestination.
Once Tinubu won the ticket, the only other viable opposition was Peter Obi. But the undoing of Obi's ambition was also its major strength: a movement of angry Nigerian youths who left no malediction, ridicule, propaganda, "agenda" to chance. Rehashing the pain of #EndSARS protests, Obidient Movement won the internet over and catapulted the man who took his best advice while a Governor from a madman into the hope of the sanest version of Nigeria: the possible utopia. If the internet could have its own Aso Rock, Peter Obi would rule it for a third term. Unfortunately, social media is not real life. In real life, Tinubu won, followed by Atiku and then Peter Obi. Tinubu's biggest ambition was achieved, but his biggest challenge remained.
Tinubu's biggest challenge as a politician was to determine which became his reputation between a mysteriously educated drug lord or a political master strategist. Immediately after the election, the opposition had the opportunity to merge powers and get to work, but they let it pass. Announcing the removal of the petrol subsidy on his first day in office was Tinubu's most daredevil move. Opposition candidates all agreed that the subsidy had to go, but where they were ready to be political, Tinubu was blunt and direct. The opposition had their second pathway, but they squandered it. They had a chance to offer an alternative path and sell it to Nigerians. For the most part, they failed at this. Instead, they were engulfed in internal conflicts in their parties. Their failure to be able to sustain intra-party politics also became emblematic of an opposition unworthy of a watchdog. In 2015, activist Aisha Yesufu had hailed Tinubu as the father of opposition in Nigeria, which largely had to do with doggedness against President Olusegun Obasanjo and his role in forming APC in 2013.
The third pathway they have had was the formation of the African Democratic Congress (ADC). For a moment, Nigerians who had grown fatigued of the split in the PDP and Obi's disenchantment with Labour Party finally found a ray of hope. Yet, the problem of ambition remained: Atiku remained a spoiler for Obi, and Obi remained a spoiler for Atiku. While they concerned themselves with pre-primary meanderings, Tinubu took one of their most vocal men, Nasir el-Rufai. From being a ministerial nominee to being a persecuted politician by the same administration, el-Rufai's trajectory in the Tinubu administration represents all of the love of the frenemy and the obscenity of Nigerian politicians. Peter Obi's exit from ADC only restored the pre-2023 arrangement, now even worse.
Neither Peter Obi nor Atiku Abubakar had the same political clout they had in 2023. Peter Obi's Obidient Movement has fractured, with main campaigners like Rinu Oduala, Aisha Yesufu, and Morris Monye involved in controversy. Obi's brief handshake with Atiku, who many Obidients deemed one of the corrupt old order, disillusioned many. His association reinforced one thing: Obi is as desperate for power as any other candidate. The more devastating blow to Obi's fanbase is the stealthy but strong rise of a collection of young and politically unashamed Nigerians who have now taken it as their life goal to return anything the Obidient Movement does, aura for aura, or offer them a taste of their own medicine. This Movement for BAT comes in multiple: by profession, by infantilisation (like Mummy's Men), and then the generic City Boy Movement.
Atiku's fortune is not helped either. Rabiu Kwankwaso's partnership with Obi reduces his Northern influence and his open clash with former President Olusegun Obasanjo, whose Vice President he was, will cost him in the West. At a time when regional power brokers like Seyi Makinde and Kayode Fayemi are strategizing with OBJ, Atiku is a victim of time and unresolved conflict again. Worse still, Peter Obi remains popular in the East. Added to these is his disclosure of intent to remove petrol subsidy. In the unlikely case that Atiku wins, restoring the petrol subsidy is going to be fatal. That would mean, most likely, the collapse of the NELFUND student loan scheme, which has catered to the academic needs of thousands of Nigerian undergraduates. Tinubu's open directive to fund the scheme using recovered loot and monies that could go into subsidy is a public documentation of a ground for political invalidation for the former VP.
It is less than five months to the presidential election, and the paths I see for the opposition against Tinubu remain bleak. In my projection, Obi and Atiku remain spoilers for each other. It would have been better if one of them was not a major candidate. Then, the effect would be less consequential. But it will not be, not like Seyi Makinde could be for Tinubu. The fourth pathway where Tinubu is defeated is as problematic as the fifth. For the fourth, it is that Atiku relinquishes his ambition and supports Obi. This will open the north up more for Peter Obi. In this case, the battleground will be the north, with Kwankwaso and Shettima hoping to deliver for their principals. It will also weaken Tinubu in the West, with whatever little Makinde might chip away and the success recorded in a swing state like Osun. But will Atiku relinquish his ambition for Peter Obi? Very unlikely (because he already had that chance when they were both in ADC).
In the fifth one, Peter also has that burden: to relinquish and make Atiku strong or not. In the unfathomable situation that he does, he loses his political base, which will make Omoyele Sowore stronger (as some Obidients had shown the tendency to consider the former student leader and activist their closest alternative). Obi's absence in the race may also solidify the oligarchic nature of Tinubu's and Atiku's philosophy. Unfortunately, however, the open rivalry between Obasanjo and Atiku may mean that the sleepy APM comes back to life and the precocious, if not prefectorial, ambition of Seyi Makinde running in 2027 might be the point of convergence for an unexpected fourth force.
The sixth pathway is when Tinubu chooses not to run or, God forbid, when he dies. I do not hold Mr President in any admiration more than I hold anyone who knows the danger to their ambition and finds their way around it. Considering Tinubu undefeatable is based on what I have shared in the earlier parts of this column. I have reservations about his political dominance, but that is the natural position for me to maintain to investigate and come to terms with realities of my time. I share the same temperament about Obi and Atiku.
The seventh pathway by which Tinubu may be defeated is when Nigerians, in a large and convincing number genuinely, against any analysis, any position (including the one shared in this article), decide to do protest votes against Tinubu. It has to come with the intensity of #EndSARS, the depth of the 2015 presidential election and the pushback against 2012 fuel subsidy removal, one of the major undoings of GEJ. It is unlikely, given the current realities. This is why I am convinced about Tinubu's return. I said it in the latter part of the second WhatsApp post I wrote on the matter: Until then [when any of the remaining four cases comes to be], the better conversation is not whether or not Tinubu will win a second term, it is what Tinubu's second term could look like, and how that affects our national and individual survival.
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